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Because of his worsening condition,
799 (citations omitted). The Court found
corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 483 u.s.
the Workers' Compensation Commis143 (1987), where the Court noted that
no merit in the Petitioners' procedural
Congress fashioned RICO after § 4 ofthe
sion reopened Victor's case and awarded
argument. Thus, the Court concluded
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.c. § 15(a). Relying on
him a continuation of his temporary total
that state courts have concurrent jurisdicta, Petitioners asserted that because
disability benefits. The Commission,
diction over civil RICO claims.
§ 4 of the Clayton Act has been interprehowever, ordered that the payment of
In the first of two concurring opinions,
ted to confer exclusive jurisdiction on
the award be suspended pending any
justice White agreed with the majority's
the federal courts, it should be inferred
appeal because it questioned whether
holding but wrote separately to express
that Congress intended, by the use of
such benefits, which are ordinarily
his fear that permitting concurrent jurissimilar language in RICO, that the Court
awarded until maximum medical imdiction over civil RICO actions would
interpret RICO the same way. The Court
provement is achieved, are available to a
inevitably
result
in
diverse
state
court
rejected this argument and pointed out
retired
claimant. On Proctor & Gamble's
interpretation
of
federal
criminal
law.
that "the question is not whether any
appeal
to
the Circuit Court for Baltimore
justice
White,
however,
did
not
believe
intent at all may be divined from legislaCity, the trial court reversed the
the possibility of non-uniform constructive silence on the issue, but whether
Commission's ruling, stating that the
tion warranted a rmding of exclusive fedCongress in its deliberations may be said
Act's purpose is not to provide additional
eral jurisdiction. Id. at BOO.
to have affirmatively or unmistakably inretirement benefits to a claimant who
tended jurisdiction to be exclusively fedjustice Scalia, joined by justice Kenvoluntarily removes himself from the
eral." TaJjlin, 110 S. Ct. at 797.
nedy, also wrote a concuring opinion.
work force. The court of appeals certiAdditionally, the petitioners argued
Both Justice Scalia and justice Kennedy
that to permit concurrent state court jufied the case before a ruling by the court
agreed with the majority's finding that a
risdiction over civil RICO claims would
of special appeals.
civil RICO claim does not meet any of the
be incompatible with federal interests.
In this case of first impression, the
three Gulf Offshore factors, and, therThe petitioners first maintained that fedcourt began its analysis by looking to the
fore, that state court jurisdicition was not
eral interests in a uniform interpretation
Act's purpose. As it had recognized in
preempted. However, neither justice
of federal criminal law would be frusprevious cases concerning the Act, the
Scalia
nor
justice
Kennedy
belived
that
trated if state courts were permitted to
court reiterated that "'[t]he general purthe
Gulf
Offshore
factors
should
be
the
hear civil RICO claims. Id. Further, they
pose
of the Workmen's Compensation
sole criteria for evaluation to determine
contended that for a state court to decide
Act [is] to provide compensation for loss
whether
state
court
jurisdiction
had
been
a civil RICO claim would require states to
of earning capaCity resulting from accipreempted.
determine which federal crimes constidental injuries sustained in industrial emDespite some minor disagreement
tute "racketeering activity" under RICO
ployment. ", Id at 630, 569 A.2d at 700
and would thereby create a diverse body
among the justices in TaJjlin, a unani(quoting
Bethlehem Shipyard v.
of precedent interpreting those crimes.
mous Court agreed that Congress had not
Damasiewicz,
187Md.474,480,50A.2d
Id. at 798. The Court rejected both of
intended to preempt state court jurisdiC799,802 (1947) (empasis added by the
Petitioner's arguments.
tion over civil RICO claims. Not only does
Victor court). Futhermore, the Act must
The Court explained that there would
the TaJjlin precedent confer greater
be
interpreted and construed to effectube no danger of inconsistent interpretapower to the states, but it serves as a
ate this purpose. Id. at 628, 569 A.2d at
tion of federal crimes because, pursuant
model for evaluating whether state court
699. The court also noted that there exto 18 U.S.c. § 3231, federal courts would
jurisdiction had been preempted.
ists a legislatively required presumption
retain "full authority and responsibility
-David B. Applefeld
in favor of injured employees that their
for the interpretation of federal criminal
Victor v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co.:
claims fall within the Act's provisions. Id.
law." Id. The Court also stated that the
VOLUNfARILY REfIRED CIAIMANf
at 628-29, 569 A.2d at 700.
federal courts would not be bound by
ENITILED TO TEMPORARY TOTAL
The Act itself, the court noted, estabstate court interpretations offederallaw.
DISABllJ1Y BENEFITS AFfER RETIRElishes the duties that employers owe to
Because this case involved civil RICO
MENf
their employees, providing, in part, that
claims, there was no danger of non-uniIn Victor v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg.
the employer shall payor provide comform imposition of federal criminal sancCo., 318 Md. 624, 569 A.2d 697 (1990),
pensation "[flor the disability or death
tions. Finally, the Court indicated that it
the Court of Appeals of Maryland held
of his employee resulting from an accihad "full faith in the ability of state courts
that a claimant who voluntarily retires is
dental personal injury sustained by the
to handle the complexities of civil RICO
entitled to the temporary total disability
employee arising out of and in the course
actions, particularly since many RICO
benefits under the Worker's Compensaof his employment .... n Id at 626 n.l,
cases involve asserted violations of state
tion
Act ("the Act"). In so holding, the
569 A.2d at 698 n.l (quoting Md. Ann.
law, such as state fraud claims, over
court reversed the trial court's ruling, and
Code art. 101 § 15 (1985 & Supp. 1989)
which state courts presumably have
upheld the decision of the Workers'
(emphasis added)). Such compensation
greater expertise. Id.
Compensation
Commission.
and benefits are referenced to disability
The Court briefly addressed the
Edward Victor, a Proctor and Gamble
petitioners' final contention that RICO's
throughout the statute. Thus, the court
employee, sustained a disability resulting
procedural mechanisms are applicable
reasoned, it is the" disability" arising from
from an accidental personal injury arising
the injury that calls for the compensation
only to federal court actions. The petiout of and in the course of his employand benefits, yet "disability" is not explictioners maintained that RICO provides
ment. He was first awarded total disabilfor extended venue and out of state seritly defined in the Act with respect to an
ity, and later, granted a supplemental
vice of process which the state court
injury arising from an industrial accident.
award for permanant partial disability.
systems could not properly handle. In
Id. at 629, 569 A.2d at 700.
Although Victor was physically able to
response, the Court pointed out that it
Thus, relying again on the Act's genwork at the time, he voluntarily retired
had "previously found concurrent juriseral purpose and the mandate of a liberal
from Proctor & Gamble. Subsequently,
construction in favor of injured employdiction even where federal law provided
his work-related condition worsened,
for special procedural mechanisms simees, the court set forth to define the
causing temporary total disability.
ilar to those contained in RICO." Id. at
legislative intent of an industrial accident
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disability. In terms of occupational diseases, the legislature had defined "disability" as the state of being incapacitated.
The court had previously held that a
claimant suffering from occupational disease need not show actual wage loss, but
rather must show a permanent or temporary incapacity from employment. Id. at
630-31, 569 A.2d at 700-0 1 (citing Miller
v. Western Electric Co., 310 Md. 173,528
A.2d 486 (1987)). In Miller, the court had
warned that a strict adherence to a wageloss requirement for compensation
would likely produce absurd results inconsistent with the Act's purpose. Id. at
631, 569 A.2d at 701. For instance, a
physically disabled worker making efforts to keep working would be deprived

of an award based solely on lost wages.
Thus, consistent with the Act's purpose,
the court held that "disability," with respect to industrial aCcidents, relates to
diminished "earning capacity," and not
to actual loss of wages per se. Id. at 632,
569 A.2d at 701.
In light of this definition, the court
reasoned that Victor's voluntary retirement was, therefore, of no consequence
on his entitlement to compensation for
temporary total disability. Id. at 632, 569
A.2d at 702. Rather, his entitlement to
compensation continued until his maximum earning capacity was fully restored.
Id. at 633, 569 A.2d at 702. Victor was
not barred from rejoining the labor force.
If Victor had not been totally disabled, he
could have sought and obtained employ-

ment elsewhere. Thus it was not Victor's
retirement that impeded his earning capacity, but the disability resulting from
his accidental injury. Id. Therefore, the
court ruled that Victor was entitled to
compensation.
In holding that voluntary retirement
does not bar a claimant from compensation for temporary total disability, the
court of appeals expanded the
employer's insurance liability by expanding the scope of eligible claiments. Consequently,
employers
and
their
insurance companies will have an even
greater obligation to ensure the safety of
employees.
-Scot Morrell
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